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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 11, 2018 Governor Phil Murphy of New Jersey sent out a tweet
to his constituents stating, “[t]oday, we’re finally making the dream of
legalized sports betting a reality for New Jersey. This is the right move for
our state and will strengthen our economy.”1 After years of litigation, the
Supreme Court had just ruled, twenty-eight days prior, that the federal law
that blocked New Jersey from legalizing sports betting, titled the Professional
and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), was unconstitutional and
therefore unenforceable.2 The State of New Jersey fought for almost six years
to legalize sports betting, beginning in August of 2012, when the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the National Basketball
Association (NBA), the National Football League (NFL), the National
Hockey League (NHL), and the Officer of the Commissioner of Baseball
doing business as Major League Baseball filed a complaint to enjoin the State
of New Jersey from implementing a sports gambling law.3
The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, enacted in 1992,
made it unlawful for any governmental entity or person to “sponsor, operate,
advertise, promote, license, or authorize . . . a lottery, sweepstakes, or other
betting, gambling, or wagering” based on amateur or professional athletes or
based on performances in amateur or professional games.4 Although the
sports gambling covered under PASPA was not a federal crime, PASPA gave
the Attorney General and professional and amateur sports organizations the
right to bring suit civilly to enjoin violations.5 After the New Jersey
1. Phil Murphy (@GovMurphy), TWITTER (June 11, 2018, 12:19 PM), https://twitter.com/Gov
Murphy/status/1006254571868520450.
2. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1485 (2018).
3. NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Governor
of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (2013).
4. 28 U.S.C.S. § 3702.
5. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470-71.
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legislature enacted a law legalizing sports gambling, the professional sports
leagues and the NCAA immediately brought suit to enjoin the new law.6
The Supreme Court held that New Jersey had authorized sports gambling
in violation of PASPA by repealing its prior prohibition on sports gambling.7
The Supreme Court also held, however, that PASPA’s provision prohibiting
states from authorizing and licensing sports gambling was unconstitutional
under the Tenth Amendment.8 Further, striking down PASPA in its entirety,
the majority of the Supreme Court held that no provision of PASPA was
severable from the provisions of PASPA that were unconstitutional.9 In
short, the Supreme Court held that even though New Jersey was in violation
of PASPA, PASPA was unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable.10
Murphy signals a significant shift in sports gambling law as more states
will likely proceed to follow New Jersey in legalizing sports gambling.11
Further, Murphy may mark a shift towards giving the states more power on a
variety of controversial issues.12 The anti-commandeering rule, which is
based on the Tenth Amendment, may become a tool that states can utilize in
future lawsuits concerning issues such as marijuana reforms, sanctuary cities,
and gun control, or where the states do not wish to follow federal rules or
guidelines dealing with these issues.13
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the 1990s, opponents of sports gambling supported legislation known
as the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).14
Supporters of this legislation argued that sports gambling is extremely
addictive and could corrupt and damage the reputation of professional and

6. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471.
7. Id. at 1474.
8. Id. at 1478.
9. Id. at 1484.
10. Id. at 1485.
11. Brent Johnson, Phil Murphy signs N.J. sports betting law. You can start betting on Thursday.,
N.J. POL. (June 11, 2018), https://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2018/06/sports_betting_to_begin_in_nj
_after_phil_murphy_si.html.
12. Cory Lapin, The Potentially Far-Reaching Implications of Murphy v. NCAA Outside of Sports
Betting, DEF. LITIG. INSIDER (May 30, 2018), https://www.defenselitigationinsider.com/2018/05/
30/the-potentially-far-reaching-implications-of-murphy-v-ncaa-outside-of-sports-betting/.
13. Id.
14. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1470.
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amateur sports.15 Those opposed argued that sports gambling is an effective
way of increasing state revenue.16 PASPA was enacted in 1992, despite the
Department of Justice’s opposition to the bill.17 PASPA did not make sports
gambling a federal crime, but it did allow the Attorney General and sports
organizations to enjoin violations.18 New Jersey had the option of being
grandfathered into PASPA in order to legalize sports gambling if it did so
within one year.19 At that time, New Jersey did not take advantage of the
grandfather provision.20 In 2011, New Jersey amended its state constitution
to make it lawful for the state legislature to authorize gambling.21 In 2012,
the legislature enacted a law authorizing gambling.22 The NCAA
subsequently brought suit to enjoin the new law.23 The Federal District Court
in New Jersey granted the injunction.24
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that
enacting the legislation violated PASPA by authorizing sports gambling.25
The court also found no anti-commandeering violation because PASPA
required no affirmative action on the part of the states.26 The Third Circuit
went on to suggest that a repeal of laws outlawing sports gambling would not
amount to an authorization as contemplated in PASPA.27 The United States
confirmed this by opposing certification to the Supreme Court.28
Subsequently, New Jersey enacted a new law framed as a repeal to allow
sports gambling in the state.29 The same plaintiffs from the 2013 case again
brought suit to enjoin the new law.30 The district court in the new case ruled
15. Id. at 1469-70.
16. Id. at 1484.
17. Id. at 1470.
18. Id. at 1470-71.
19. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Christie, 926 F. Supp. at 553.
24. Id. at 579.
25. NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 227 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d sub nom. Murphy v.
NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
26. Id. at 231.
27. Id. at 233.
28. See Christie v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014), cert. denied; N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen’s
Ass’n v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014), cert. denied; Sweeney v. NCAA, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014), cert.
denied.
29. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1472.
30. NCAA v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 490 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Governor
of N.J., 832 F.3d 389 (3d Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
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in favor of the NCAA.31 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court’s decision, stating this law authorized sports
gambling, notwithstanding its contrary statements in the previous case.32 The
Third Circuit indicated that a de minimis repeal would not have authorized
sports gambling, in an effort to reconcile with its prior statement.33 The Third
Circuit also found no violation of the anti-commandeering rule.34 The
Supreme Court granted certification to determine whether PASPA fit within
the constitutional doctrine of dual sovereignty.35
III. COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. Plurality Opinion by Justice Alito, in which Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, Justice Kagan, and Justice Gorsuch
joined, and in which Justice Breyer joined as to all but Part VI-B
In part II of the opinion, the Court decided what the meaning of
“authorizing” sports gambling was.36 The justices decided that authorization
of an activity can be a partial or complete repeal of an old law.37 The plurality
reasoned that at the time of PASPA’s passage, sports gambling was largely
illegal within the states.38 Therefore, authorizing an activity that is largely
illegal would typically take place in the form of repealing the laws that make
the activity illegal.39 After the respondents argued that this definition of
“authorize” did not make sense in the context of the parallel provision
applying to conduct done “pursuant to the law . . . of a governmental entity,”
the Court was still not convinced.40 The Court gave the example, “[n]ow that
the State has legalized the sale of marijuana, Joe is able to sell the drug
pursuant to state law” 41 to demonstrate how one could use the phrase to refer
to an activity that was previously prohibited. Further, the plurality reasoned
31. Id. at 508.
32. NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 402 (3d Cir. 2016).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Christie v. NCAA, 137 S. Ct. 2327, 2328 (2017), cert. granted; N.J. Thoroughbred Horsemen’s
Ass’n v. NCAA, 137 S. Ct. 2326 (2017), cert. granted.
36. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474.
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that Congress would not have meant to have an unclear line for determining
when a repeal constitutes an authorization.42 Finally, the justices stated that
respondents could not use the canon of constitutionality to justify their
meaning, because even if the Court accepted respondent’s meaning, it would
still be unconstitutional.43
In part III of the opinion, the Court discussed the anti-commandeering
doctrine.44 The anti-commandeering doctrine is based on the Tenth
Amendment.45 The powers that Congress has are enumerated, and the Tenth
Amendment states that all powers not specifically given to Congress are
reserved for the states.46 The Tenth Amendment can give rise to tension with
the Supremacy Clause, which states that federal law is the supreme law of the
land and that when federal and state law conflict, the state law is preempted.47
A leading case in this area is New York v. United States.48 In New York,
Congress had recently passed the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985.49 One provision of the Act required states to either
take title to low-level radioactive waste or to regulate radioactive waste
according to Congress’s instructions.50 Because this portion of the Act either
made states take ownership of the waste or made them legislate as Congress
directed, this was considered unconstitutional under a principle that has come
to be known as the anti-commandeering doctrine.51 The Court in New York
stated that the Constitution did not give Congress the power to direct the state
legislatures in this manner.52 Even though the states had a choice between
the two alternatives, the option to take title commandeered states into the
service of federal regulatory purposes, and the second option required states
to regulate according to Congress’s standards, neither of which, according to
the New York Court, were constitutional.53

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 1475.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1476.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476.
Id.
505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
Id. at 149.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 175).
Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 176).
Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166).
Id. (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 175).
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The next case to apply the anti-commandeering doctrine was Printz v.
United States.54 In Printz, the Brady Act directed state law enforcement to
assist with background checks related to the sale of firearms.55 The Supreme
Court found that this Act was also unconstitutional as it dragooned states law
enforcement in violation of the anti-commandeering doctrine.56 The Court in
Printz held that Congress has no power to “command the states’ officers, or
those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program.”57
The Court has provided several policy reasons for the anticommandeering doctrine.58 First, the Court stated it serves as a safeguard for
protecting the sovereignty of the states.59 Second, the Court stated that a
balance between state and federal governments reduces the risk of tyranny
and abuses of power.60 Third, the Court stated the doctrine promotes
accountability for both the states and Congress.61 If Congress forced a state
to adopt or enforce federal regulations, the public might not know whether
Congress or the state is to blame.62 Fourth, the Court stated the doctrine
prevents Congress from making the states bear the cost of federal
regulations.63
In part IV of the Murphy opinion, the Court discussed the Tenth
Amendment implications of PASPA.64 The Court found PASPA violated the
anti-commandeering doctrine.65 The plurality reasoned that even though
PASPA was not a directive for the states to commit an affirmative act,
PASPA was still directing the states to behave in a certain way by their
modifying existing laws.66 The justices found there was no distinction
between these forms of federal control over state legislative processes.67
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
Id. at 902.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 935).
Id. (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 935).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1479.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.
Id.
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Further, the Court found that even though there were prior decisions where
the Court found federal laws constitutional and not in violation of the anticommandeering doctrine, those decisions were distinguishable from the case
at bar.68
In South Carolina v. Baker69, Congress had passed the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). This Act removed a federal tax
exemption from bearer bonds and only allowed the exemption for registered
bonds in order to avoid tax evasion.70 The Court in Murphy found that this
situation was distinguishable, however, because the law did not order the
states to enact or to refrain from enacting any laws.71 Therefore, the Court
held that regulating state activities in which private actors and states both
engage, rather than forcing the states to regulate activities and shifting the
burden of regulation onto them, is constitutional.72
Similarly, in Reno v. Condon73, the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of
1994 (DPPA) regulated the disclosure of personal information that motor
vehicle departments obtained. The Court found this Act constitutional as well
because the Act did not require the states to regulate their citizens in a specific
way.74 Further, in this case, Congress was again regulating a state activity
that private actors and states both engaged in.75 Conversely, in Murphy,
Congress mandated that the states refrain from enacting certain laws, and
gave a cause of action to enjoin the states from enacting those laws.76
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association77, the
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977 allowed states to choose
whether or not to implement a regulatory scheme that complied with the Act.
If the states did not choose to implement a regulatory scheme, the Federal
Government would regulate the states directly.78 The Court in Murphy again
decided that this case was distinguishable because the Act did not require the

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 1478.
485 U.S. 505, 507 (1988).
Id. at 507-08.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1478.
Id.
528 U.S. 141, 143 (2000).
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479.
Id. at 1479.
Id. at 1478.
452 U.S. 264, 269 (1981).
Id. at 271.
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states to take any affirmative action, nor did it require them to regulate for
Congress.79 Congress would regulate if the states wanted Congress to do so.80
Lastly, in FERC v. Mississippi81, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 (PURPA) required state utility commissions to consider FERC
proposals. The Court in Murphy found this law distinguishable from PASPA
because PASPA required states to do more than just consider not legalizing
sports gambling, while PURPA merely asked states to consider federal
regulatory standards.82
In part V of the opinion, the Court discussed whether preemption based
on the Supremacy Clause was applicable in Murphy.83 The Court held that
PASPA was not a preemption provision.84 The Court found that PASPA was
not a valid example of preemption because preemption is based on a federal
law that regulates the conduct of private actors, and PASPA is not directed
towards regulate private actors, it is directed towards state activity.85 The
Court reasoned that section one of PASPA had no direct regulatory effect on
private actors.86 This provision only regulated the states.87 The Court went
on to find that section two of PASPA did not regulate the states and did
regulate private actors.88 The Court stated, however, that this section was not
challenged by petitioners.89 The Court then went on to describe three types
of preemption that are recognized: conflict preemption, express preemption,
and field preemption.90
First, the Court explained conflict preemption by using the case Mutual
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett.91 In this case, a federal law that prohibited
79. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479.
80. Id.
81. 456 U.S. 742, 746 (1982).
82. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479; Although the Murphy Court states that all PURPA did was ask
states to consider the federal regulations, in reality, the states were also required to follow specific
procedures while considering each of the regulations. For example, public hearings were required to be
held and if the regulation was not adopted, the state was required to have a written statement of reasons
for the public. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 748.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1481.
87. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479.
88. Id. at 1481.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1480.
91. Id. (citing Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013)).
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alterations to labels on drugs approved by the FDA was in conflict with a
state law that required drug warnings to be strengthened as new information
was gathered.92 The Court found that a patient’s cause of action against the
drug company for not warning of a disease was preempted because the federal
law prohibited the company from doing so.93 This federal law preempted the
state law because the two laws were in direct conflict.94
Second, the Court explained express preemption by using the case
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.95 In Morales, the Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978 expressly stated: “no State or political subdivision . . . shall enact
or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provisions having the
force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air
carrier.”96 The Murphy Court explained that this language, although it looked
to be commandeering at first glance, was put into place to allow private
parties a federal right to operate in accordance with solely federal
regulation.97 This type of language is illustrative of express preemption.98
Lastly, the Court used Arizona v. United States99 to explain field
preemption. In Arizona, the federal government sought to enjoin the State of
Arizona after the state enacted a law concerning immigration.100 The federal
government, however, had already instituted extensive federal regulations on
this topic.101 The Arizona Court stated when the Federal Government
institutes a “framework of regulation ‘so pervasive . . . that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it’” 102 state law is preempted on the
grounds of field preemption.
Again, the Court states that PASPA is not a preemption provision.103 The
Court reiterates that PASPA does not regulate private actors in any way and
therefore cannot preempt New Jersey’s regulation of private actors.104 The
Court recognizes that the second provision of PASPA is a direct order to
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480 (citing Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., 570 U.S. at 480-86).
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480 (citing Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. 570 U.S. at 493).
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480 (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992)).
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 420).
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480.
Id.
Id. at 1481 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)).
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 393 (2012).
Murphy, 138 St. Ct. at 1481.
Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481.
Id.
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citizens, but the Court chooses to instead decide that this case is not a
preemption case.105 The Court does so because they say the first provision
can only be understood as a direct order to the states.106
In part VI of the opinion, the Court inquired as to whether the
unconstitutional portions of PASPA were severable from the remainder of the
Act.107 First, the Court stated that the prohibition of state licensing of sports
gambling is unconstitutional on the same ground that the prohibition of state
authorization was.108 This was still a direct command to the states in violation
of the anti-commandeering doctrine.109
Second, the Court decided whether the provisions in PASPA that
declared it unlawful for states to operate, sponsor, or promote sports gambling
were severable.110 The Court stated that in order to find constitutional
provisions in PASPA severable from the unconstitutional provisions, the
Court must find that Congress would have enacted the constitutional
provisions independently from the unconstitutional provisions.111 The Court
found that these provisions were not severable from the unconstitutional
provisions.112 The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend for sports
gambling to be legal for private parties only.113 Further, the line between
sponsoring or promoting and authorizing, licensing, and operating is unclear
and this lack of clarity would create a large amount of litigation.114
Third, the Court considered whether the second section of PASPA which
prohibited private actors to engage in sports gambling was severable from the
first unconstitutional provision concerning the states.115 The same test still
applied to this provision: in order to find the provision severable, the Court
must find that Congress would have enacted the constitutional provisions
independently from the unconstitutional provisions.116 The Court found that

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1481-82.
Id.
Id. at 1482.
Id.
Id. at 1483.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482.
Id. at 1483.
Id.
Id.
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these provisions were not severable from each other.117 The Court reasoned
that the two provisions were meant to be utilized in tandem to prevent sports
gambling from occurring.118 Further, because of the way the statute is
written, an individual would be acting unlawfully if he or she was engaging
in sports gambling that is legal in that state, and then logically the opposite
would also have to be true.119 A person can only act lawfully under section 2
if sports gambling is illegal in that state.120 The Court found that this result
would make no sense and therefore was not severable from section 1 of the
statute.121
Lastly, the Court decided whether the provisions of PASPA that
prohibited advertising of sports gambling were severable.122 Again, the Court
found that these provisions were not severable.123 The Court found that in
1975, Congress passed a statute to exempt advertisements regarding lotteries
conducted by states and it would not make sense to prevent advertising of
sports gambling if sports gambling, like lotteries, was legal to conduct in the
states.124
In closing, the Court stated that although sports gambling is controversial
and requires important policy choices, it is now up to the states to decide
whether sports gambling should be permitted or not.125 The Court reiterated
that Congress had no power to regulate the state governments in the manner
that they did and reversed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.126
B. Concurring Opinion by Justice Thomas
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas agreed with the Court’s
opinion, however, he was concerned with the current state of the severability
doctrine.127 Justice Thomas was concerned with two main issues.128 First,
Justice Thomas found that the severability doctrine does not follow the

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 1484.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484.
Id. at 1483-84.
Id.
Id. at 1484.
Id.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484.
Id.
Id. at 1484-85.
Id. at 1485.
Id. at 1484 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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principles of statutory interpretation.129 He believed that determining
whether Congress would have enacted the other parts of the statute had they
known one portion would be unconstitutional asks the Court to try to
determine a legislative intent that likely does not exist.130 Second, Justice
Thomas argued that making determinations on portions of statutes that have
not been called into question is too similar to issuing advisory opinions.131
He was concerned that the Court was bringing up issues concerning questions
that had not been raised.132 In sum, Justice Thomas raised significant issues
regarding the current contours of the severability doctrine.133
C. Opinion by Justice Breyer concurring in part and dissenting in part
Justice Breyer dissented and wrote a separate opinion, while also joining
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion in part and joining the majority opinion
in part.134 Justice Breyer believed that section two of PASPA was severable
from section one, and therefore section two, which prohibits individuals from
engaging in sports gambling, could have remained in effect.135 Justice Breyer
called into question the majority’s conclusion that Congress would not have
intended to enact section two of PASPA had they known section one was
unconstitutional.136 Justice Breyer considered other reasons Congress might
have enacted section two of PASPA.137 First, Congress could have enacted
section two to prevent sports gambling from spreading.138 Second, Congress
could have enacted section two as a backup provision in case section one
turned out to be unconstitutional.139 Justice Breyer criticized the majority for
not severing the two sections of the statute.140

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 1486.
Id. at 1486-87.
Id. at 1487.
Id.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1487.
Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1488
Id.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1488.
Id.
Id.
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D. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ginsburg, in which Justice Sotomayor
joined, and in which Justice Breyer joined in part
Justice Ginsburg also dissented, joined by Justice Sotomayor, and joined
in part by Justice Breyer.141 Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority on
the severability issue.142 Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority for
destroying PASPA in its entirety instead of severing the unconstitutional
portions from the remainder of the statute.143 Justice Ginsburg would have
kept the portions of the statute which prohibited “sponsoring, operating,
advertising, or promoting” sports gambling schemes and prohibited private
parties from “sponsoring, operating, advertising, or promoting” sportsgambling schemes if state law authorized them to do so.144 Justice Ginsburg
argued that the federal government is permitted to regulate local activities
and therefore all provisions that did not directly commandeer the states
should have remained valid because they were severable from the
unconstitutional portions of the statute.145
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
The Tenth Amendment states, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.”146 This statement has been taken to
mean that any power not explicitly given to the federal government is a power
that is left to the states, and therefore the Federal Government has no authority
to use that power.147 This Amendment is the basis for the anticommandeering doctrine and states who refuse to comply with federal
regulation often invoke this doctrine to justify their decisions.148
In Murphy, the Court made important decisions regarding the anticommandeering doctrine which directly speak to the balance of powers

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 1488 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1489.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1490.
Id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
New York, 505 U.S. at 155.
Brief for Petitioner at 4, Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018) (No. 16-476).
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between the states and federal government.149 The Court went on to make a
controversial decision regarding the current state of the severability
doctrine.150 Lastly, the Court’s decision in Murphy will likely have
implications in a variety of fields where the legal debate between state and
federal law continues.151
B. Discussion
1. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine Receives a Better
Definition
The anti-commandeering doctrine first arose in Hodel, where the Court
stated that in order for a piece of legislation to be invalid under the Tenth
Amendment, it must meet a three-part test.152 First, the statute must regulate
the “states as states.”153 Second, the regulation must address matters that are
attributes of state sovereignty.154 Third, the states’ compliance with the
regulation would affect their ability to operate in areas where they were
traditionally regulating the same activity.155 Also, even if all three of these
requirements are met, a Tenth Amendment violation is not certain to occur.156
Hodel also stated that if the Federal Government has preempted a specific
area affecting interstate commerce, the states have no right to regulate that
area themselves.157 This ruling paved the way for other states to challenge
statutes and regulations and this rule has developed since the holding in
Hodel.158
The next main case to discuss the scope of Congress’s powers was FERC
v. Mississippi.159 In FERC, the Court found that legislation enacted under the
Commerce Clause can only be found unconstitutional if there was no rational
basis for finding that the activity affects interstate commerce.160 This gave
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Murphy, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1485.
Id.at 1484.
Lapin, supra note 12.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 287.
Id.
Id. at 287-88.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 288 n.29.
Hodel, 452 U.S. at 286.
FERC, 456 U.S. at 745.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 754.
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Congress more power because this rational basis standard was highly
deferential.161 So long as the regulated activity was related to interstate
commerce in one way or another, Congress retained power that supersedes
the states’ powers to regulate that activity.162 This case expanded the range
of statutes and regulations Congress could enact in order to control state
activities.163
South Carolina v. Baker164 evaluated whether a section of the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, which required states to issue bonds
in registered form was unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment. In this
case, the Court stated that the statute only regulated state activities, it did not
influence the way that the states regulated private parties.165 This rule again
gave Congress more power to control the states’ activities.166 This holding
gave Congress the power to regulate all private parties within the states and
found that even if the new legislation required the states to take action by
enacting or repealing their current laws, this was still constitutional.167
Next, in New York v. United States the Court sharply departed from South
Carolina v. Baker.168 The Court in New York found that Congress was not
regulating only private parties as they had in Baker.169 The Court found that
a federal law was unconstitutional because it required states to take title to
radioactive waste or to regulate in the manner Congress directed.170 The
Court stated that Congress did not have the power to instruct the states in this
manner, and this was the first major ruling in favor of state’s rights, which
recognized the Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering doctrine.171 This
case signaled a shift towards state’s rights.172 Printz, which was decided just
five years after New York, reiterated this same principle.173 Printz again

161. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rational Basis Test is Constitutional (and Desirable), 14 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 401, 401 (2016).
162. FERC, 456 U.S. at 754.
163. Id. at 758.
164. 485 U.S. 505, 508.
165. Id. at 514.
166. Id. at 514-15.
167. Id.
168. 505 U.S. at 188.
169. Id. at 160.
170. Id. at 176.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 188.
173. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
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stated that the Federal Government cannot command the states to administer
or enforce a regulatory program.174
Reno again went back to the principle that the Federal Government can
regulate state activities rather than forcing the states to enact regulations.175
This principle seems to be left over from Hodel and Baker, even after New
York and Printz were decided.176 This case also reiterated the principle
leading up to the decision in Murphy that a federal statute cannot require a
state to enact specific laws or regulations, nor can it require the state to
regulate private individuals.177
All of these cases lead up to the current definition of anti-commandeering
that was presented in Murphy.178 The majority opinion went through all of
these cases and explained the current rule regarding violations of the Tenth
Amendment.179 After Murphy, it appears that the Federal Government cannot
order a state’s officials to enforce federal regulations.180 Neither can a state
be forced to enact or repeal a particular statute.181 The court tells us in
Murphy that the Tenth Amendment stands for the idea that Congress cannot
send a direct order the state’s legislature to either take action or not take action
when it comes to running their sovereign governments.182 What Congress
can still do, however, is regulate the states itself.183 Congress can also
evenhandedly regulate an activity itself when both states and private actors
engage in that activity.184
The rule in Murphy seems to be different from the original rule in
Hodel.185 States are no longer required to prove a three-part test to determine
a statute is unconstitutional.186 States need only show now a direct order to
the legislature to regulate an activity at the hands of the Federal
174. Id.
175. Reno, 528 U.S. at 151.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477.
179. Id. at 1476-77.
180. Id. at 1477. Although the Court says this referring to the Printz case, this is not exactly true.
There are federal regulations that require state officials to act in order to meet federal regulations. For
example, national fingerprint databases and other criminal databases require state officials to act.
181. Id. at 1478.
182. Id.
183. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476.
184. Id. at 1478.
185. Id. at 1476.
186. Id.
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Government.187 This new rule appears to give states a much better chance at
having the Supreme Court find a statute unconstitutional.188
2. Looking to Congressional Intent When Severing
Unconstitutional Statutes
One thing the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions could not
agree on was whether to look to congressional intent when severing
unconstitutional statutes.189 The rule the majority relied on when determining
whether to sever the PASPA provisions states, “it must be ‘evident that
[Congress] would not have enacted those provisions which are within its
power, independently of [those] which [are] not.”190 When applying this rule,
it was then necessary to try to find what Congress would have wanted the law
to be had they known one portion of the Act was unconstitutional.191 This is
where the majority opinion diverged from the dissenting opinions.192
Justice Thomas expressed his concern with this severability principle
because he believed this doctrine does not align with basic principles of
statutory interpretation.193 Although the Supreme Court has gone back and
forth over the years whether to use congressional intent when interpreting
statutes, since the Justice Scalia era, justices have argued that looking for
congressional intent is not a reliable or plausible way to interpret statutes.194
Justice Thomas raised a valid issue here, and demonstrated this point when
he observed that it is unlikely Congress would have had specific intent on this
question because it does not pass statutes with the expectation that they will
be found unconstitutional in the future.195 Justice Thomas believed that by
trying to find a congressional intent that is not likely to exist, the judicial

187. Id. at 1477.
188. Ilya Somin, Federalism Comes Out as the Winner in Murphy v. NCAA, REG. REV. (July 10,
2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/07/10/somin-federalism-comes-out-winner-murphy-v-ncaa/.
189. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484, 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring); Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J. dissenting);
Id. at 1488 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
190. Id. at 1482 (citing Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1484, 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring); Id. at 1488 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Id. at 1489
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 1486 (Thomas, J., concurring).
194. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1486 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 320, n.7 (2005)).
195. Id. at 1486-87.
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branch is exceeding its power.196 This is the main point of division between
the majority and separately written opinions.
Will this rule regarding severability be a lasting one? It is likely it will
not be. The precedent shows that the Supreme Court typically tries to sever
unconstitutional portions of statutes from constitutional portions.197 As the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Murphy point out, there is no reason
not to enforce a portion of a statute that is constitutional.198 This is seen as
potentially giving the judiciary too much power to “make” laws as it sees
fit.199
If the courts should not determine congressional intent for severability
issues though, this leaves the problem of what the courts should do when
determining whether unconstitutional portions of laws are severable from
constitutional portions.200 In Murphy, the Court looked to congressional
intent to determine whether the remainder of the Act was severable.201
However, in Alaska Airlines,202 the rule was applied differently. Even though
the Murphy Court cited Alaska Airlines in its opinion, it did not seem to
follow the rule from Alaska Airlines.203
In Alaska Airlines, after the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was found
unconstitutional, the Court decided that the Act could be severed.204 In doing
so, the Court stated “ʽ [a] Court should refrain from invalidating more of the
statute than is necessary . . . it is the duty of this court to . . . maintain the act
in so far as it is valid.’”205 The Murphy Court, however, conspicuously left
this language out when stating the rule for severability in its opinion.206 This
previous rule seems to be more restrictive and more deferential towards the

196. Id. at 1487.
197. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320, 328-29 (2006), (citing United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 227-229).
198. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1490 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 1487 (Thomas J., concurring) (citing Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85
N.Y.U.L. REV. 738, 752-53 (2010).
200. Id. at 1487.
201. Id. at 1482.
202. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987).
203. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482 (citing Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684).
204. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 697.
205. Id. at 684 (citing Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984)).
206. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482.

https://digitalcommons.onu.edu/onu_law_review/vol45/iss1/8

18

Bishop: Murphy v. NCAA 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018)

2019]

MURPHY V. NCAA

257

Act itself.207 Although the Alaska Airlines Court did look to legislative
history and congressional intent, the Court also stated that it is more relevant
to look to whether the statute will function in a manner consistent with
congressional intent, rather than if Congress would have enacted it at all.208
This seems to imply that instead of looking to whether Congress would have
wanted the constitutional portions to remain in effect, courts should look to
whether the remainder of the statute is operable in accordance with
Congress’s intent when it enacted the statute.209
In Murphy, Justice Ginsburg argued that PASPA was operable in
accordance with Congress’s intent when it enacted the statute.210 Justice
Ginsburg recognized that the rule used in previous cases tried to salvage
statutes rather than find the entire Act unenforceable.211 Justice Ginsburg
even stated that with PASPA, “it is scarcely arguable that Congress ‘would
have preferred no statute at all.’”212 Here, Justice Ginsburg is arguing that
the theory of looking to Congress’s intent on the remainder of the statute is
unreliable and it would make more sense to look to whether the rest of the
statute can operate in a logical and constitutional manner.213 Justice
Ginsburg’s argument would also be more in line with the ruling from Alaska
Airlines in that regard.214
The severability doctrine will likely not continue to operate in the manner
the Murphy Court utilized it.215 As Justice Thomas and Justice Ginsburg both
pointed out, it does not make sense to look to whether Congress would have
anticipated the situation of having a portion of a statute ruled
unconstitutional, because it is not its goal to enact unconstitutional statutes.216
The rule that Alaska Airlines cited makes more sense to apply when
determining severability.217 By according more deference to Congress, and
207. Id. at 1489 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg explains that the Court would not
ordinarily find the entire statute unconstitutional, but that is not what the majority did here with their
interpretation of the severability doctrine.
208. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.
209. Id.
210. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1490 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
211. Id.
212. Id. (citing Exec. Bens. Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014)).
213. Id. at 1489-90.
214. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684, (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam),
quoting Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm’n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).
215. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1487 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas suggests the Court should
reconsider its severability precedents.
216. Id. at 1487.
217. Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.
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assuming that the rest of the statute is valid so long as it is operable, the
concerns for the judicial branch exceeding its powers are alleviated.218
Going forward, Congress could reenact the portion of the statute that the
Supreme Court found to be not severable, although there appears to be no
pending legislation at this time.219 This would make it clear that it was
Congress’s intent to retain that portion of the statute, and it is unlikely the
Supreme Court could find other grounds on which to find it unenforceable.220
This would return the states to the position where private actors cannot
engage in sports gambling, which would be a significant limitation compared
to the state of the law after Murphy.221
3. Potential Impact on States’ Rights After Murphy v. NCAA
The Murphy decision appears to enlarge states’ rights. The idea that
Congress cannot force states to enact or repeal laws or force states to regulate
its citizens in a particular way has been reinforced by the Supreme Court.222
Murphy does not simply allow New Jersey to enact legislation to legalize
sports gambling.223 The Murphy decision will likely have important
implications in a variety of fields.224 First, states may point to this decision
as the debate on legalization of marijuana continues.225 Second, states may
invoke Murphy when passing legislation regarding gun control.226 Third,
sanctuary cities might be impacted by the Murphy decision as the
immigration debate continues to unfold.227
First, state and federal marijuana laws are in direct conflict with each
other in some states.228 For example, in a state where marijuana is legal under
218. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1487 (Thomas, J., concurring).
219. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 274 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. Id.
221. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1484-85.
222. Id. at 1476-77.
223. Sam Kamin, Murphy v. NCAA: It’s about much more the gambling on sports, HILL (May 15,
2018), http://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/387653-murphy-v-ncaa-its-about-much-more-than-gamblingon-sports.
224. Id.
225. Mikosra, The Implications of Murphy v. NCAA for State Marijuana Reforms, VAND. U. L. SCH.
MARIJUANA L., POL’Y, & AUTHORITY (May 17, 2018), https://my.vanderbilt.edu/marijuanalaw/
2018/05/the-implications-of-murphy-v-ncaa-for-state-marijuana-reforms/.
226. Lapin, supra note 12.
227. Id.
228. Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L.
REV. 74, 77 (2015).
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the state laws but it is still considered a controlled substance and is illegal
under federal law, the state might now be able to make a compelling argument
that Congress cannot force the states to modify their laws and they must make
their own choices about regulation, per the decision in Murphy.229 Further,
the states might argue that they have the power to enact any laws or repeal
any laws that they see fit to legalize marijuana, just as New Jersey did with
sports gambling in Murphy.230 Therefore, if the Federal Government tries to
force states to repeal laws legalizing marijuana use or enact laws prohibiting
marijuana use, the Federal Government cannot compel them to.231
Second, Murphy might influence future decisions on gun control.232 At
a time where a large portion of the public is demanding regulation at a federal
level for guns, the states might not have to go along with Congress’s decision
in this area either.233 For example, if Congress were to pass a law forcing the
states to enact legislation to regulate guns in a particular manner, this law
would be similar to the PASPA provision in Murphy and could be found
unconstitutional on the ground that the federal government cannot force states
to enact laws or regulate activities simply because Congress tells them to.234
It appears Congress would have to step in and enact an entire statutory
scheme for regulating gun use in the states if it wanted to do so in a
constitutional manner.235
Lastly, the same issue arises as cities are refusing to follow the Federal
Government’s orders when it comes to immigration.236 Cities that are
refusing to cooperate with immigration departments are becoming known as
sanctuary cities, and it would appear these cities could use the same
arguments that were raised in Murphy as well.237 If a state wanted to make
the decision not to prosecute an illegal immigrant, after the Murphy decision,
it appears that Congress cannot force a city to pass legislation criminalizing
the immigrant’s status.238 The Federal Government must step in and regulate
229. Mikosra, supra note 221.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Lapin, supra note 12.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Amy Howe, Opinion analysis: Justices strike down federal sports gambling law, SCOTUS
BLOG (May 14, 2018), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/opinion-analysis-justices-strike-downfederal-sports-gambling-law/.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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themselves and again, an argument could be made that they cannot force the
states to do anything in the situation.239
After the Murphy decision, the states have more ammunition to be able
to tell the Federal Government that they will not regulate activities on behalf
Congress.240 Congress is not allowed to tell the states they must enact, refrain
from enacting, or repeal laws.241 On the other hand, Congress is still open to
regulate private actors within the states as it sees fit on its own. Should
Congress go forward with spending the money to regulate these activities
itself, the states would not be able to fight against the Federal Government.242
However, as the war between state and federal powers continues, Murphy
seems to say that the federal government should defer to the states more often,
and holding true to the Tenth Amendment, if the power was not explicitly
given to the Federal Government, the power belongs to the states.243
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy serves as an important
expansion on the anti-commandeering and severability doctrines.244 Further,
this decision will likely impact other controversial issues that are currently of
interest,245 namely, states’ rights when deciding whether to enforce the
federal government’s policies.246 As a result, the Supreme Court left the state
of the law with an anti-commandeering doctrine that enlarges state powers
and a rule regarding severability that does not appear to be sustainable.247 The
states are left with ammunition for the legalization of marijuana, passage or
refusal to pass gun control laws, and refusal to comply with immigration
policies.248 Although the Supreme Court’s current position on severability is
concerning, overall, this decision will likely have a substantial impact.249
ERICA L. BISHOP
239. Id.; Although the Federal Government would need to step in and regulate by themselves in
theory, some people argue that the Federal Government usually just ties its political goals to its funding
for the states in order to incentivize the states to conform.
240. Kamin, supra note 219.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1476.
244. Id. at 1479.
245. Lapin, supra note 12.
246. Id.
247. Id.; Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1487 (Thomas, J., concurring).
248. Lapin, supra note 12.
249. Id.
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